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Abstract
One of the challenges in foundations of ﬁnance is the so-called “no
trade theorem” paradox: if an expert trader wants to sell some stock,
that means that this trader believes that this stock will go down; however, the very fact that another expert trader is willing to buy it means
that this other expert believes that the stock will go up. The fact that
equally good experts have diﬀerent beliefs should dissuade the ﬁrst expert
from selling – and thus, trades should be very rare. However, in reality,
trades are ubiquitous. In this paper, we show that a detailed application
of decision theory solves this paradox and explains how a trade can be
beneﬁcial to both seller and buyer. This application also explains a known
psychological fact – that depressed people are usually more risk-averse.
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Formulation of the Problem

“No trade theorem” paradox. When a bank or a hedge fund wants to buy
a stock, this means that professionals running this ﬁnancial institution believe
that, in the future, this stock will increase in price. This makes perfect sense
until we realize that for this institution to be able to buy this stock, some
other institution needs to be willing to sell it at this price – which means that
professionals running that other instutition must believe that, in the future, this
stick will decrease in price.
Stock market is not a game for amateurs, serious agents buying and selling
stock are smart experts who know what they are doing and who, in the past,
have shown a good intuition about future stock values. So, even when such
an expert initially thinks that this stock will increase in price, the very fact
that this stock is available for sale means that another expert has an exactly
opposite belief. This should, in many cases, dissuade the ﬁrst expert from his
or her original belief.
Similarly, an expert who is initially eager to sell, i.e., who initially believes
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that this stock will decrease in price, should be dissuaded by the presence of
similarly qualiﬁed experts who are willing to buy, i.e., who believe that this
stock will increase in price.
If we follow this logic, then very few agents will be trading stocks – but in
reality, the trading volume is very high, every second, a huge amount of stocks
change hands. This paradoxical behavior is known as a “no trade theorem”;
see, e.g., [8, 12].
What we do in this paper. In this paper, we use decision making to show
that in reality, trading makes perfect sense if we take into account diﬀerent risks
associated with diﬀerent stocks.
Our explanation also explains another empirical phenomenon, a phenomenon
from psychology – that depressed people are more risk-averse.

2

Decision Theory: A Brief Reminder

What is traditional decision theory. Traditional decision theory (see, e.g.,
[1, 4, 7, 10, 11]) described preferences of rational agents, i.e., e.g., agents that
when preferring A to B and B to C would always prefer A to C.
Comment. It is well known that real agents are not perfectly rational (see, e.g.,
[2, 6]), for the simple reason that our ability to process information and select
an optimal decision is bounded. However, in many cases, traditional decision
theory still provides a very good picture of human behavior.
The notion of utility. To describe the preferences of such an agent, we can
select two alternatives:
• a very bad one A− that is much worse than this agent will actually encounter, and
• a very good one A+ that is much better than this agent will actually
encounter.
For each value p from the interval [0, 1], we can form a lottery L(p) in which we
get A+ with probability p and A− with the remaining probability 1 − p.
When p is close to 1, this means that we are almost certainly getting a very
good deal. So, for any realistic option A, the corresponding lottery L(p) is better
than A: A < L(p). Similarly, when p is close to 0, this means that we are almost
certainly getting a very bad deal, so L(p) < A. There should be a threshold
u at which the preference L(p) < A corresponding to smaller probabilities p is
replaced by an opposite preference A < L(p). In other words, we should have:
• L(p) < A for all p < u and
• A < L(p) for all p > u.
This threshold value is called the utility of the alternative A; it is denoted by
u(A).
2

The above two conditions means that, in a certain reasonable sense, the
original alternative A is equivalent to the lottery L(u(A)) corresponding to the
probability u(A): A ≡ L(u(A)).
A rational agent should maximize utility. Of course, the larger the probability of getting a very good outcome A+ , the better. Thus, among several
lotteries L(p), we should select the one for which the probability p of getting
A+ is the largest. Since each alternative A is equivalent to the corresponding lottery L(u(A)), this implies that we should select the alternative with the
largest possible value of utility.
Main conclusion of traditional decision theory: a rational agent must
maximize expected utility. In practice, we rarely know the consequences
of each action. At best, we know possible outcomes A1 , . . . , An , and their
probabilities p1 , . . . , pn . Since each alternative Ai is equivalent to a lottery
L(u(Ai )) in which we get A+ with probability u(Ai ) and A− with the remaining
probability 1 − u(Ai ), the whole action is equivalent to a two-stage lottery in
which:
• ﬁrst, we select one of the n alternatives Ai with probability pi , and
• then, depending on which alternative Ai we selected on the ﬁrst stage, we
select A+ with probability u(Ai ) and A− with the remaining probability
1 − u(Ai ).
As a result of this two-stage lottery, we get either A+ or A− . The probability
u of getting A+ can be computed by using the formula of complete probability,
it is equal to
u = p1 · u(A1 ) + . . . + pn · u(An ).
This is exactly the formula for the expected value of the utility u(Ai ). Thus,
the utility of each action to a person is equal to the expected value of utility.
Thus, according to the traditional decision theory, rational agents should
select the alternative with the largest possible value of expected utility.
How utility is related to money. The dependence of utility of money is
non-linear: namely, √utility u is proportional to the square root of the amount
m of money u = c · m; see [2] and references therein.
Comment. This empirical fact can be explained. For example, the non-linear
character of this dependence is explained, on a commonsense level, in [3], while
the square root formula can also be explained – but it requires more mathematical analysis; see, e.g., [6]. In the current paper, we simply take this fact as a
given, and use it to explain the “no trade theorem” paradox.
How to compare current and future gains: discounting. How can we
compare current and future gains? If we have an amount m of money now, then
we can place it in a bank and get the same amount plus interest, i.e., get the new
def
amount m′ = (1+i)·m in a year, where i is the interest rate. Thus, the amount
def

m′ in a year is equivalent to the value m = q · m′ now, where q = 1/(1 + i).
3

This reduction of future gains – to make them comparable to current gains – is
known as discounting.
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Analysis of the Problem and the Resulting
Explanation of the “No Trade Theorem” Paradox

Towards formulation of the problem in precise terms. Let us assume
that the person originally had the amount M of money. This person is thinking
of possibly buying a stock which costs s.
Let us also assume an ideal situation, in which everyone has the same information about the future value of this stock, namely, everyone knows the
probability distribution of its next year’s gain. In particular, everyone knows
the mean m′ and the standard deviation σ ′ of this future gain. After discounting, we get the mean m = q · m′ and the standard deviation σ = q · σ ′ of the
equivalent current gain.
Let us also make a realistic assumption that the price s, the mean m, and
the standard deviation σ are much smaller than the current money amount
M . In other words, we assume that we are talking about a usual trade, not
about extreme situations in which a person gambles his or her whole fortune by
investing it all in a seemingly attractive stock.
Analysis of the problem. Let us denote the diﬀerence between the actual
def
(discounted) value v of the stock and its mean value m by ∆v = v − m. By
deﬁnition of the mean, we have m = E[v], where E[·] denoted the mean value.
Thus, the mean value of ∆v is 0: E[∆v] = 0.
[
]
The mean value of (∆v)2 is, by deﬁnition, equal to σ 2 : E (∆v)2 = σ 2 .
In these terms, the (discounted) future gain is equal to v = m + ∆v. The
discounted future amount of money can be obtained if we take the original
amount M , subtract the cost s of the stock, and add the gained value v =
m + ∆v; as a result, we get the value M − s + m + ∆v.
The utility is proportional to the square root of money. We can always select
a unit of utility so that utility will be exactly
√ equal to the square root of money.
In this case, the original utility is u = M , and√the discounted future utility
corresponding to buying a stock is equal to u = M − s + m + ∆v.
As we have mentioned in the previous section, a rational person should select
the alternative with the largest possible value of expected utility E[u]. Thus,
for the agent, it makes sense to buy the stock if
[√
] √
E[u] = E
M − s + m + ∆v > M .
If we have a reverse inequality, then, as one can easily see, it is beneﬁcial for this
person to sell this stock. So, to decide whether it is beneﬁcial
[√for a person to sell]
or buy the stock, we need to estimate the value E[u] = E M − s + m + ∆v
of the expected utility.
4

Estimating the value of the expected utility. We assumed that the values m, s, and σ are much smaller than M . Thus, the corresponding random
value
∆v is also much smaller than M . So, we can expand the expression
√
M − s + m + ∆v in Taylor series in terms of s, m, and ∆v, and keep only
linear and quadratic terms in this expansion. As a result, we get the following
expression:
√
√
1
1
M − s + m + ∆v = M + √ · (−s + m + ∆v) −
· (−s + m + ∆v)2 .
3/2
4
·
M
2 M
]
[
If we open the parentheses and take into account that E[∆v] = 0 and E (∆v)2 =
σ 2 , we conclude that the expected utility of buying the stock is equal to
√

1
1
M + √ · (m − s) −
· ((m − s)2 + σ 2 ).
4 · M 3/2
2 M
√
√
Thus, this value is larger than the original utility M if and only if E[u]− M >
0, i.e., if and only if
E[u] =

1
1
√ · (m − s) −
· ((m − s)2 + σ 2 ) > 0.
4 · M 3/2
2 M
Multiplying both sides by 4 · M 3/2 , we get an equivalent inequality
2M · (m − s) − ((m − s)2 + σ 2 ) > 0,
i.e., equivalently, 2M · (m − s) > ((m − s)2 + σ 2 ) and
def

M > M0 =

(m − s)2 + σ 2
.
2(m − s)

(1)

This explains the “no trade theorem” paradox. For the same stock with
the same information about its future gains, whether it is beneﬁcial to buy it
or sell it depends on the initial amount of money that a trader has:
• if the trader has a large amount of money M , then buying a stock whose
expected beneﬁts m exceed the buying cost s makes perfect sense, even
when the risk σ is reasonably high;
• on the other hand, if the trader has a not so large amount of money and
the stock is risky, then for this trader, it makes sense to sell this stock.
For this stock, for almost all traders (with a rare exception of a trader whose
current amount is exactly M0 ), it is either beneﬁcial to buy (if M > M0 ) or to
sell (if M < M0 ).
Thus, for the same stock, with the same information, we always have many
traders for whom it is beneﬁcial to buy, and we have many traders for whom it
is beneﬁcial to sell. This explains the ubiquity of trading.
5
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Auxiliary Result: Decision Theory Explains
Why Depressed People Are More Risk-Averse

Empirical fact. It has been observed that depressed people are more riskaverse, i.e., they are less willing to make decisions involving risks; see, e.g., [5, 9].
Our explanation. Each risky decision is described by the same formulas as a
particular case of buying-a-stock risky decision: we may gain something, we may
lose something, all we know is the probability distribution of the corresponding
gains and losses.
Thus, to decide when it is beneﬁcial to participate in a risky activity, we
can use the same formulas as above – the only diﬀerence is that
√ instead of just
money amount M and the corresponding initial utility u0 = M , we can take
into account diﬀerent things that aﬀect the person’s utility. In terms of utility
u0 , the inequality (1) – that describes when it is beneﬁcial for a person to engage
in a risky behavior – takes the form
def

u20 > M0 =

(m − s)2 + σ 2
.
2(m − s)

(2)

This formula says that when the initial value of the utility u0 is small, risky
behavior – with large σ – is not beneﬁcial. And this is exactly what depression
means in decision-theoretic terms: that a person is not very happy, i.e., that
the corresponding utility value u0 is small.
Thus, our decision-theoretic analysis explains the above-mentioned psychological phenomenon.
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